All are respondents under PWDVA, enjoy!

The main point of this Supreme Court judgment is that female relatives of husband can be made respondents under DV Act. Being apex court judgment, it overrides any other HC judgments which might have disallowed roping in of husbands’ relatives under DV Act.

14. In such circumstances, it is clear that the
legislature    never    intended       to   exclude      female
relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Full judgment text is below:

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.271 OF 2011
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2854 of 2010)

Sou. Sandhya Manoj Wankhade               … Appellant

Vs.

Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade & Ors.             … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.
1.    Leave granted.

2.    This Appeal is directed against the judgment
and   order    dated   5th   March,   2010,   passed   by   the
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Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Crl. W.P.
No.588 of 2009, inter alia, directing the Appellant to vacate her matrimonial house and confirming the order of the Sessions Judge deleting the names of the other Respondents from the proceedings.

3.     The   Appellant        herein     was     married       to     the
Respondent      No.1    on    20th     January,      2005,     and   the
marriage was registered under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. After her marriage, the Appellant began to reside with the Respondent No.1
at     Khorej    Colony,      Amravati,       where     her     widowed
mother-in-law       and      sister-in-law,       the      Respondent
Nos.2 and 3 respectively, were residing.                      According
to the Appellant, the marriage began to turn sour after about one year of the marriage and she was
even    assaulted      by    her    husband    and    by     the    other
respondents.       It is her specific case that on 16th
June,    2007,    she       was    mercilessly       beaten     by   the
Respondent No.1, which incident was reported to the
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police and a case under Section 498-A I.P.C. came to be registered against him.

4.     In addition to the above, the Appellant appears
to     have    filed     a    complaint,            being    Misc.    Crl.
Application         No.203    of    2007,      on    16th   July,     2007,
against all the Respondents under Sections 12, 18,
19,    20     and   22   of   the       Protection     of    Women     from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, hereinafter referred
to    as    “the     Domestic       Violence        Act,    2005”.       An
application         filed     by    the       Appellant      before    the
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati, under Section 23 of the above Act was allowed by the
learned       Magistrate,      who       by   his    order    dated    16th
August, 2007, directed the Respondent No.1 husband to pay interim maintenance to the Appellant at the
rate of        1,500/- per month from the date of the
application till the final disposal of the main application and also restrained all the Respondents
from        dispossessing          the        Appellant       from     her
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matrimonial home at Khorej Colony, Amravati, till the final disposal of the main application.

5.   It further appears that the said order of the
learned     Magistrate     dated       16th    August,    2007,     was
challenged by Respondent No.1 in Crl. Appeal No.115
of   2007        before   the        learned     Sessions     Judge,
Amravati, who by his order dated 2nd May, 2008, dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by the orders
passed      by     the    learned       Sessions         Judge,     the
Respondent No.1 filed Criminal Application No.3034 of 2008 in the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
challenging the order dated 16th August, 2007 of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati and the order dated 2nd May, 2008 of the Sessions Judge, Amravati. The said application was dismissed by the High Court on 4th September, 2009.

6.   In the meanwhile, the Respondent No.2 filed an
application       in   Misc.    Crl.    Application        No.203    of
2007 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First
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Class, Amravati, praying for modification of its order dated 16th August, 2007 and a direction to the Appellant to leave the house of Respondent No.2.
The said application for modification was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on 14th July, 2008 holding
that     it   was   not   maintainable.       Thereupon,      the
Respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed Crl. Appeal No.159 of
2008 on 11th August, 2008, under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, questioning the orders passed by the learned Magistrate on 16th August,
2007 and 14th July, 2008, on the ground that being women they could not be made Respondents in the
proceedings     filed     by    the    Appellant    under     the
provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and
that   the    matrimonial      house   of   the   Appellant   at
Khorej    Colony,   Amravati,      belonged   exclusively     to
Ramabai, the Respondent No.2 and mother-in-law of the Appellant and did not, therefore, come within the definition of “shared house”. The said Criminal Appeal No.159 of 2008 was allowed by the learned
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Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 15th July,
2009.     The learned Sessions Judge allowed Criminal
Appeal No.159 of 2008 and set aside the judgment and order dated 14th July, 2008 and also modified the order dated 16th August, 2007, to the extent of
setting     aside       the   injunction     restraining      the
Respondents        from   dispossessing      or   evicting    the
Appellant        from   her   matrimonial    house   at    Khorej
Colony, Amravati.         The Respondent No.1 husband was
directed to provide separate accommodation for the residence of the Appellant or to pay a sum of
1,000/- per month to the Appellant from the date of filing of the application till its final decision, in lieu of providing accommodation.

7.      In Criminal Writ Petition No.588 of 2009, the
Appellant herein challenged the judgment and order
dated     15th    July,   2009,     passed   by   the     learned
Sessions Judge, Amravati, in Crl. Appeal No.159 of 2008, claiming that she had a right to stay in her
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matrimonial    house.   Although,          the   question     as   to
whether a female member of the husband’s family could be made a party to the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, had been raised in Crl. Appeal No.159 of 2008, the learned Sessions Judge in his order dated 15th July, 2009, did not decide the said question and did not absolve the Respondent Nos.2 and 3 herein in his order, but only observed that female members cannot be made parties in proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as “females” are not included in the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) of the said Act.

8.   The    learned   Single       Judge    of   the   High   Court
disposed of the writ petition by his judgment and order dated 5th March, 2010, with a direction to the Appellant to vacate her matrimonial house, which was in the name of the Respondent No.2, with a further direction to the Trial Court to expedite
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the hearing of the Misc. Crl. Application No.203 of
2007 filed by the Appellant herein and to decide
the same within a period of six months.           A further
direction was given confirming the order relating to deletion of the names of the `other members’.

9.   Questioning the said judgment and order of the
Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, Mr. Garvesh
Kabra,        learned    Advocate    appearing        for    the
Appellant, submitted that the High Court had erred in confirming the order of the learned Sessions
Judge    in     regard   to   deletion   of   names     of   the
Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from the proceedings, upon confirmation of the finding of the Sessions Judge that no female could be made a party to a petition under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, since the expression “female” had not been included in the definition of “respondent” in the said Act. Mr.
Kabra submitted that it would be evident from a plain reading of the proviso to Section 2(q) of the
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Domestic    Violence    Act,       2005,    that    a     wife   or   a
female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage can, not only file a complaint against her husband or male partner but also against relatives of the husband or male partner. The term “relative”
not having been defined in the Act, it could not be said that it excluded females from its operation.

10. Mr.     Satyajit     A.        Desai,    learned        Advocate
appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, defended the orders passed by the Sessions Judge
and   the   High     Court     and    urged        that    the   term
“relative” must be deemed to include within its ambit only male members of the husband’s family or
the family of the male partner.                    Learned counsel
submitted that when the expression “female” had not been specifically included within the definition of
“respondent”    in     Section       2(q)     of     the    Domestic
Violence Act, 2005, it has to be held that it was
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the intention of the legislature to exclude female members from the ambit thereof.

11. Having     carefully   considered    the   submissions
made on behalf of the respective parties, we are
unable   to    sustain   the    decisions,   both   of   the
learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court, in relation to the interpretation of the expression
“respondent”     in   Section    2(q)   of   the    Domestic
Violence Act, 2005.        For the sake of reference,
Section 2(q) of the above-said Act is extracted hereinbelow :-

“2(q). “respondent” means any adult male
person who is, or has been, in a domestic
relationship with the aggrieved person and
against whom the aggrieved person has
sought any relief under this Act:
Provided that an aggrieved wife or
female living in a relationship in the
nature of a marriage may also file a
complaint   against  a   relative of the
husband or the male partner.”
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12. From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a
domestic   relationship        with       the    aggrieved   person,
the proviso widens the scope of the said definition
by   including    a    relative      of    the    husband    or   male
partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.

13. It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint
could   also    be     filed   against      a     relative   of    the
husband    or    the    male    partner.           No   restrictive
meaning    has        been     given       to     the    expression
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“relative”,    nor    has   the    said     expression     been
specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.

14. In such circumstances, it is clear that the
legislature    never    intended       to   exclude      female
relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

15. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the
High   Court   went    wrong      in   holding    otherwise,
possibly being influenced by the definition of the expression “respondent” in the main body of Section
2(q) of the aforesaid Act.

16. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds.           The judgments
and orders, both of the learned Sessions Judge,
Amravati, dated 15th        July, 2009 and the Nagpur
Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 5th March, 2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No.588 of 2009 are set
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aside.   Consequently,   the   trial    Court              shall
also
proceed against the said Respondent Nos.2 and 3 on the complaint filed by the Appellant.

17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

…………………………………………J.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)

…………………………………………J.
(CYRIAC JOSEPH) New Delhi
Dated:31.01.2011

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