Following SC judgment says that appeal to supreme court known as special leave petition (SLP) under Article 136 of the Indian constitution can be rejected if the statements made by appellant are found to be false.  Also article 136 does not grant a right to any party to appeal.

Article 136 of constitution is given below:

136. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter,
the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating
to the Armed Forces.

The important points are made bold in judgment below:

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ITEM NO.101(PH) COURT NO.11 SECTION XI
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 5239 OF 2002
DALIP SINGH Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)
(With appln(s) for exemption from filing O.T.,directions and office
report )
Date: 03/12/2009 This Appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
For Appellant(s)
Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh, Adv.
Mr. Prashante Jha, adv.
Ms. Manjula Gupta,Adv.
For Respondent(s)
Mr. L.K. Pandey,Adv.
Mr. Pramod Swarup, Sr.Adv.
Mr. S.K. Dwivedi, Adv.
Mr. Amit Singh, adv.
Ms. Sushma Verma, Adv.
Mr. Chandra Prakash Pandey ,Adv
Dr. Krishan Singh Chauhan ,Adv
Mr. K.C. Lamba, adv.
Mr. Chand Kiran, Adv.
Mr. Kartar Singh, Adv.
UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
This appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed
reportable order.
(Sukhbir Paul Kaur) (Mithlesh Gupta)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file)
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5239 OF 2002
DALIP SINGH Appellant(s)
Versus
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic
values of life i.e., `Satya' (truth) and `Ahimsa' (non-violence).
Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to
ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an
integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-
independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in
the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system.
The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for
personal gain has become so intense that those involved in
litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those
who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They
shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving
their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed
of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules
and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to
pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim
or final.
2. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, this Court
adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the
appellant by making the following observations:
"It is of utmost importance that in making material
statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution,
care must be taken not to make any statements which are
inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with
applications for special leave, the Court naturally
takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained
in the petitions at their face value and it would be
unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making
statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at
the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied
that the material statements made by the appellant in his
application for special leave are inaccurate and
misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that
the appellant may have obtained special leave from the
Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as
misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for
special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the
conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to
the appellant ought to be revoked."
3. In Welcome Hotel and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and
others etc. AIR 1983 SC 1015, the Court held that a party which has
misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled
to be heard on the merits of the case.
4. In G. Narayanaswamy Reddy and others v. Governor of
Karnataka and another AIR 1991 SC 1726, the Court denied relief to
the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made
by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section
11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by
the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the
Court observed:
"Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special
Leave Petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to
know about these orders only when the respondents appeared
in response to the notice and filed their counter
affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a
direct bearing on the question raised and the non-
disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of
material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave
Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled
in law that the relief under Article 136 of the
Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who
approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank
and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and
suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be
dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave
Petitions."
5. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by L.Rs. and others JT 1993 (6) SC 331, the Court held that
where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important
document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown
out at any stage of the litigation.
6. In Prestige Lights Ltd. V. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC
449, it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but
is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's
jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to
place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If
there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been
placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in
refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J.
in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 K.B. 486, and
observed:
"In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the
conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction.
If the applicant does not disclose full facts or
suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of
misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the
action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The
rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter
unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court
by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction
rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts.
If the material facts are not candidly stated or are
suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the
writ courts would become impossible."
7. In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of A.P. and
others, AIR 2007 SC 1546, the Court held that Article 136 does not
confer a right of appeal on any party. It confers discretion on
this Court to grant leave to appeal in appropriate cases. In other
words, the Constitution has not made the Supreme Court a regular
Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. This Court only intervenes
where justice, equity and good conscience require such intervention.
8. In Sunil Poddar & Ors. v Union Bank of India (2008) 2 326,
the Court held that while exercising discretionary and equitable
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and
circumstances of the case should be seen in their entirety to find
out if there is miscarriage of justice. If the appellant has not
come forward with clean hands, has not candidly disclosed all the
facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay the proceedings,
then the Court will non-suit him on the ground of contumacious
conduct.
9. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others
(2008) 12 SCC 481, the court held that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and
discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner approaching
the Writ Court must come with clean hands and put forward all the
facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything
and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of
relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of
misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold
without considering the merits of the claim. The same rule was
reiterated in G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and
others (2009) 3 SCC 141.
10. This appeal, which is directed against order dated
21.5.2001 passed by the Allahabad High Court is illustrative of how
unscrupulous litigants can mislead the authorities entrusted with
the task of implementing the provisions of U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for short, "the Act") and the
courts for retaining possession of the surplus land. The tenure-
holder Praveen Singh did not file statement in terms of Section
9(2-A) of the Act in respect of his holding as on 24.1.1971. After
about four years, the Prescribed Authority issued notice dated
29.11.1975 under Section 10(2) of the Act and called upon Shri
Praveen Singh to show cause as to why the statement prepared under
Section 10(1) of the Act may not be taken as correct and his land
may not be declared surplus accordingly. A copy of the statement
was sent to Shri Praveen Singh along with the notice in C.L.H. Form
No.4. For the sake of convenient reference, the notice is
reproduced below:
"C.L.H. FORM NO. 4
(See Rule 8)
(Form of Notice under Section 10(2) of the imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961)
To,
Name of tenure-holder Sri Praveen Singh
With parentage s/o. Shri Raghubir Singh and
Address r/o Village Tisotara, P.O. Khas, Pargana
Kirat Pur, Tehsil Najibabad, District
Bijnor.
Whereas you have failed to submit a statement/have
furnished incomplete/incorrect statement in respect of all
your holdings in the State of Uttar Pradesh including
holdings of your family members with all the required
particulars within the time mentioned in the notice in
C.L.H. Form 1, published under Section 9;
And whereas the statement of all holdings held by you
in the State on 8th June, 1973, statement showing proposed
ceiling area applicable to you and the proposed surplus
land have been prepared under sub-section (1) of Section
10, they are sent to you herewith and you are hereby
called upon to show cause within a period of 15 days from
the date of service of this notice, why the said statement
be not taken as correct.
On your failure to dispute the correctness of the
statements in any court, within the time allowed, the
aforesaid statement shall be treated as final and ceiling
area applicable to you and the surplus land shall be
determined accordingly.
Given under my hand and seal of the Court this day of
29-11-1975.
S/d-
Signature of the Prescribed Authority of the Sub-
Division Prescribed Authority
Tehsil Najibabad."
11. The notice was delivered to Shri Praveen Singh on
3.12.1975, but he neither filed any objection to the proposed
determination of his surplus land nor sought extension of time for
the said purpose. After service of notice, the Prescribed Authority
adjourned the case on 10.12.1975 and again on 19.12.1975 apparently
with the hope that the tenure-holder may file objection to the
statement prepared under Section 10(1). This is evident from the
proceeding sheets of the two dates, which are reproduced below:
Proceedings dated 10.12.1975
10.12.1965 File received after service of notice on
the tenure-holder on 3.12.1975.
It is ordered that the file be put up on
19.12.1975 after receipt of objections.
Sd/-
Prescribed Authority
Proceedings dated 19.12.1975
19.12.1975 File put up. The tenure-holder has not
filed any objection despite service.
It is ordered that the file be put up for
ex-parte orders on 27.12.1975.
Sd/-
Prescribed Authority"
12. On 27.12.1975, the Prescribed Authority noted that Shri
Praveen Singh has not filed any objection and declared that 18.22
acres of irrigated land was surplus in the hands of the tenure-
holder. After six months and twelve days, Shri Praveen Singh
submitted an application dated 8.7.1976 along with what was termed
as an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority and prayed that ex
parte order dated 27.12.1975 may be set aside and he may be given
opportunity to file objections and tender evidence. The Prescribed
Authority rejected the application on the same day i.e. 8.7.1976 by
observing that no valid ground has been made out for reconsidering
the matter after six months. The appeal preferred by Shri Praveen
Singh against the order of the Prescribed Authority was dismissed by
Additional Commissioner (Judicial), Allahabad (Appellate Authority)
in default because no one appeared on the date of hearing. The
restoration application filed by Shri Praveen Singh was dismissed on
27.8.1980. He then challenged the orders of the Prescribed
Authority and Appellate Authority in Writ Petition No. 8342/1980,
which was allowed by the High Court and the matter was remitted to
the Appellate Authority with a direction to decide the application
of Shri Praveen Singh afresh in accordance with law.
13. In compliance of the direction given by the High Court, the
Appellate Authority reconsidered the appeal of Shri Praveen Singh
but dismissed the same on the ground that the tenure-holder had not
filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condonation of the delay and even in the application filed for
setting aside the ex parte order, no cause was shown for the delay.
The Appellate Authority also observed that the tenure-holder had not
denied receipt of notice dated 29.11.1975 issued under Section 10(2)
of the Act, but did not file any objection till the passing of ex
parte order on 27.12.1975 and that his assertion of having come to
know of the ex parte order from Lekhpal Halqa on 7.7.1976 is not
believable. It appears that after remand of the matter by the High
Court, Shri Praveen Singh died and, therefore, his legal
representatives (including the appellant herein) were substituted in
his place.
14. The legal representatives of Shri Praveen Singh jointly filed
Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 22790/1990 and prayed for
quashing of orders dated 27.12.1975, 8.7.1976, 7.8.1990 passed by
the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority respectively.
They also prayed for issue of a direction to the Appellate Authority
to remand the case to the Prescribed Authority for entertaining
their objections. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition, the
following statement was made:
"That the petitioner's late father, against whom the
proceedings had been initiated under Section 10(2) of
the Ceiling Act, filed application on 8.7.1976
supported by an affidavit stating therein clearly that
he was seriously ill for about ten months as such he
was not in a position to file objection, and as a
matter of fact he did not have any knowledge of the
date of the proceedings that were being conducted
before the prescribed authority. True copy of the
application dated 8.7.1976 of petitioners' late father
is annexed herewith as Annexure 2. True copy of the
affidavit filed in support of the application dated
8.7.1976 of the petitioners' father is annexed herewith
as annexure 3."
(Emphasis added)
15. By an order dated 7.9.1990, the learned Single Judge of the
Allahabad High Court stayed the operation of the orders passed by
the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. The interim
order remained operative till 21.5.2001 that is the date on which
the writ petition was finally dismissed and during the interregnum
the appellant continued to enjoy the property.
16. In the special leave petition filed against the order of the
High Court, notice was issued on 12.10.2001, but the appellants
prayer for stay was declined. Thereafter, the surplus land of the
tenure-holder was distributed among the landless persons who were
joined as parties pursuant to order dated 27.3.2006 passed in I.A.
No. 9/2004.
17. After service of notice, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed
counter in the form of an affidavit of Shri Pradip Kumar Singh,
Additional Tehsildar, District Bijnor, U.P. In his affidavit, Shri
Pradip Kumar gave details of the steps taken by the Prescribed
Authority in terms of Section 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act and made a
categorical assertion that notice issued on 29.11.1975 was duly
served upon Shri Praveen Singh on 3.12.1975. This is evident from
paragraphs 4(iv) and (v) of the counter affidavit read as under:
"(iv) That the averments of facts made in the list of
dates against date 7.7.1976 are not admitted being
incorrect. The notice in CLH Form No. 4 having been
served on the tenure-holder on 3.12.1975, it was for him
to have filed his objection. It was for the tenure-holder
to have managed his affairs. It is not for a Court or an
Authority to communicate to the tenure-holder each and
every order passed by it once service of the notice is
complete, the Act does not require that each and every
date of proceedings and the copy or information about the
final order ex parte or otherwise be served on him. The
tenure-holder avoided to file his objections since he had
none. The statement of surplus land is prepared by the
revenue authorities in accordance with the provisions of
the Act which is prepared on the basis of revenue records
of land held by a tenure-holder in his name and there is
`Presumption of correctness of the revenue record.'
(v) That the averments of fact in list of date
against date 8.7.1976 are not admitted as stated. It is
submitted that an application dated 8.7.1976 filed by the
tenure-holder did not dispute service of notice in CLH
Form No. 4 dated 29.11.1975. The application was of a
general nature. If a tenure-holder having been asked to
file objections within 15 days of the date of service of
him `chooses not to do so', would proceed to a presumption
that he has nothing to say. Section 11 o the Act provides
that where a tenure-holder chooses not to dispute and not
to file any objection to the statement prepared by the
Prescribed Authority under Section 10 of the Act within
the stipulated period, the Prescribed Authority `shall'
accordingly determine the surplus land of the tenure-
holder. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act further
provides that where an application is made by a tenure-
holder within thirty days of the date of an order under
sub-section (11) of the Act, that being a statutory duly
cast on the Prescribed Authority. In the present case the
Prescribed Authority after passing order dated 27.12.1975
fixed the next date as 27.1.1976 i.e. after 30 days and it
is only on 27.1.1976 that the Prescribed Authority sent
notification regarding publication of surplus land in
official Gazette which was so published on 5.6.1976."
18. Shri Sunil Kumar Singh, son of the appellant Dalip Singh
and grandson of late Shri Praveen Singh filed rejoinder affidavit
dated 18th February, 2002. In paragraph 3 of the rejoinder affidavit
Shri Sunil Kumar Singh made the following statement :-
"That it is denied categorically that the father of the
petitioner had ever received the notice dated
29.11.1975 along with the statement of surplus land,
prepared under section 10(1) of the Act. It is humbly
stated that father of the petitioner could not file any
show cause without going through the above referred
statement prepared under Section 10(1) of the Act."
19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized
the record. In our opinion, the appeal is liable to be dismissed
only on the ground that the tenure-holder Shri Praveen Singh did not
state correct facts in the application filed by him on 8.7.1976
before the Prescribed Authority for setting aside the ex parte order
and the appellant did not approach the High Court with clean hands
inasmuch as, by making a misleading statement in paragraph 3 of the
writ petition, an impression was created that the tenure-holder did
not know of the proceedings initiated by the Prescribed Authority.
By making the said statement, the appellant succeeded in persuading
the High Court to pass an interim order which resulted in
frustrating the efforts made by the concerned authority to
distribute the surplus land among landless persons. Even before
this Court, a patently false statement has been made in the
rejoinder affidavit on the issue of receipt of notice dated
29.11.1975 by Shri Praveen Singh.
20. A perusal of application dated 8.7.1976 submitted by Shri
Praveen Singh for setting aside ex parte order dated 27.12.1975
passed by the Prescribed Authority makes it clear that he had
pleaded his continuous illness for ten months as the cause for his
inability to file objection. In paragraph 2 of the application,
Shri Praveen Singh made a suggestive assertion that he had no
knowledge of the proceedings initiated by the Prescribed Authority
and he came to know about the case having been decided ex parte only
on 7.7.1976 when he went to Lekhpal to procure memo. There was not
even a whisper in the application that notice dated 29.11.1975
issued by the Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) of the Act
had not been served upon him and on that account he could not file
objections within 15 days. The application filed by Shri Praveen
Singh was not supported by any medical certificate or other evidence
which could prima facie establish that he was really sick for ten
months. This is the reason why the Prescribed Authority refused to
reconsider order dated 27.11.1975 and the Appellate Authority
declined to entertain his prayer for remand of the case to the
Prescribed Authority for the purpose of fresh determination of
surplus area case. Notwithstanding this, in the writ petition filed
before the High Court a misleading statement was made that due to
serious illness, Shri Praveen Singh could not file objection and, as
a matter of fact, he did not have any knowledge of the dates of
proceedings which were conducted by the Prescribed Authority. In
view of that statement, the learned Single Judge of the High Court
felt persuaded to stay the orders passed by the Prescribed Authority
and Appellate Authority which, as mentioned above, resulted in
frustration of the action to be taken by the concerned authority for
distribution of the surplus land to landless persons for a good
period of more than eleven years and enabled the heirs of Shri
Praveen Singh to retain possession of the surplus land and enjoy the
same. Before the High Court also, no evidence was produced in
support of the assertion regarding serious illness of Shri Praveen
Singh. Insofar as this Court is concerned, Shri Sunil Kumar Singh,
grandson of Shri Praveen Singh and son of the appellant, boldly made
a false statement that his grandfather did not receive notice dated
29.11.1975 along with the statement of surplus land prepared under
Section 10(1) and he could not file any show cause without going
through the statement. We are amazed at the degree of audacity with
which Shri Sunil Kumar Singh could make a patently false statement
on oath.
21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that in this
case efforts to mislead the authorities and the courts have
transmitted through three generations and the conduct of the
appellant and his son to mislead the High Court and this Court
cannot, but be treated as reprehensible. They belong to the
category of persons who not only attempt, but succeed in polluting
the course of justice. Therefore, we do not find any justification
to interfere with the order under challenge or entertain the
appellant's prayer for setting aside the orders passed by the
Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority.
22. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We would have saddled
the appellants with exemplary costs but, keeping in view the fact
that possession of the surplus land was taken in 2002 and the same
has been distributed among landless poor persons, we refrain from
doing so.
.......................J.
[G.S.Singhvi]
.......................J.
[Asok Kumar Ganguly]
New Delhi
December 3, 2009